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1. Introduction 
Assume Peggy ("the Prover") knows some information. For instance, this 
could be the proof of a theorem or the prime factorization of a large integer. 
Assume further that Peggy's information is verifiable, in the sense that there 
exists an efficient procedure capable of certifying its validity. In order to con-
vince Vic ("the Verifier") of this fact, Peggy could simply reveal the inf orma-
tion to him so that he could perform the certifying procedure himself. This 
would be a maximum disclosure proof, since it results in Vic learning all the 
information. He could therefore later show it to someone else and even claim 
it to have been his originally. 
In this paper we give a general protocol for obtaining minimum disclosure 
proofs and several practical ways to actually implement it. This protocol 
allows Peggy to convince Vic, beyond any reasonable doubt, that she has 
information that would pass the certifying procedure, but in a way that does 
not help him determine this information. For example, if Peggy's information 
is the proof of a theorem, Vic is left with the conviction that Peggy knows 
how to prove it, and hence that the theorem is true. However, Vic is not 
given even a clue as to how the proof might proceed (except perhaps for an 
upper limit on its length). Although Peggy's original information is verifiable, 
the conviction thus obtained by Vic may not be. In particular, conducting 
the protocol with Peggy need not (and in many cases will not) enable Vic to 
subsequently convince someone else. 
The notion of minimum disclosure proofs extends to the case of probabil-
istically verifiable information. Assume for instance that Peggy generates two 
integers that are almost certainly prime according to some probabilistic algo-
rithm [Rl, SS]. She computes their product, makes it public, and then claims 
that she knows its prime factorization. Does she have verifiable information 
to support her claim, considering the fact that she does not have a definite 
proof that her factors are prime? In a case like this, even though the efficient 
certifying procedure for her information is probabilistic, it still makes sense 
for her to use a minimum disclosure proof to convince Vic that her claim is 
true. Our protocol for minimum disclosure extends to the case of probabilist-
ically verifiable information. 
1\t the heart of all our protocols is the notion of bit commitment, which 
allows Peggy to commit herself to the value of some bits in a way that 
2 
prevents Vic from learning them without her help. Bit commitment is imple-
mented through our main primitive, which we call for convenience the 
"blob ". As this paper shows, the blob is a universal primitive for minimum 
disclosure. Each blob is used by Peggy as a commitment to either 0 or 1. 
For the sake of generality, we do not impose any restriction on the nature of 
blobs - they could be made out of fairy dust if this were useful. By "Peggy 
commits to a blob", we mean that Peggy has a blob "in mind" and that she 
does something that will force her to stick to this blob in the future. If the 
blob itself can be represented as a bit string - as in most practical cases -
committing to a blob can be as simple as showing it in the clear. The 
abstract defining properties of blobs are as follow : 
i) Peggy can commit to blobs : by committing to a blob, she is in 
effect committing to a bit. 
ii) Peggy can open any blob she has committed to : she can convince 
Vic of the value of the bit she in effect committed to when she 
committed to the blob. Thus, there is no blob she is able to 
"open" both as 0 and as 1. 
iii) Vic cannot learn anything about which way Peggy is able to open 
any unopened blob she has committed to. This remains true even 
after other blobs have been opened by Peggy. 
iv) Blobs do not carry "side information" : the blobs themselves as well 
as the processes by which Peggy commits to and opens them are 
uncorrelated to any secret she wishes to keep from Vic. 
Consider the following illustrative implementation of a blob. When 
Peggy wishes to commit to a bit (property (i)), she writes it on the floor and, 
before allowing Vic to look, she covers it with opaque tape. Although Vic 
cannot tell which bit is hidden under the tape (property (iii)), Peggy can no 
longer change it. To "open the blob" (property (ii)), Peggy allows Vic to strip 
off the tape and look at the bit. Property (iv) is satisfied provided the way in 
which the bit is written on the floor, the tape and its placement are all 
uncorrelated to any secret Peggy wishes to keep from Vic. 
In the following sections, we assume that blobs are available and show 
ho~. to use them to obtain general minimum disclosure protocols. Sections 2 
and 3 deal with the case of deterministically verifiable information. After a 
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complexity theoretic interlude in section 4, section 5 gives the general protocol 
for probabilistically verifiable information. Under various assumpti~ sec-
tion 6 describes several implementations for blobs and compares their relative 
strengths and weaknesses. As we shall see, some blob implementations lead 
to protocols that protect Peggis information unconditionally but that would 
allow her to lie to Vic by breaking some cryptographic assumption in real 
time. One subtle point - not illustrated by the floor-and-tape example - is 
that it is not necessarily the case that each given blob must encode a unique 
bit: more generally, it is Peggy's knowledge about the blob that determines 
which bit is involved. Dual blob implementations are unconditionally secure 
for Vic, but could allow him to recover Peggy's information after some long 
(perhaps infeasible) off-line computation. Other implementations show nei-
ther weakness, but rely on dogmas of quantum physics or require the partici-
pation of several parties. The last section compares these implementations. 
1.1. Related work 
As occurs often in research, some of the ideas presented here were developed 
independently in several places. An early interactive proof was presented by 
Rabin [R2]. This concept was formalized and the notion of "zero-knowledge" 
protocols (which is related to minimum disclosure) were introduced in 
[GMR]. Also, [Ba] formalized a notion similar to that of interactive proofs. 
The model proposed in [GMR, Ba] is quite interesting from a theoretical point 
of view, but it is based on the assumption that the prover has unlimited com-
puting power. 
Assuming only the existence of secure probabilistic encryption schemes 
(in the sense of [GM]), [GMW] showed that "Every language in NP has a 
zero-knowledge interactive proof system in which the prover is a probabilistic 
polynomial-time machine that gets an NP proof as an auxiliary input". 
Under a stronger assumption, the same result was obtained independently but 
subsequently in [BCl]. A similar result was also obtained independently by 
[Ch4], but in a very different model, which emphasizes the unconditional 
privacy of the prover's secret information, even if the verifier has unlimited 
computing resources. This model was set forward in [Ch2] and the result of 
[Ch4] is a special case of a protocol previously presented in [Chl], whose pro-
perties are described in [Ch2, page 1039]. (The results of [Ch4] (then [Ch3]) 
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and [GMW] were first presented explicitly in March 1986 at the Marseille 
conference on Algorithms, Randomness and Complexity.) Finally, [BG2] con-
sidered a model in which all parties involved are assumed to have "reason-
able" computing power (this model is also compatible with the setting of 
[Ch4]). The current paper unifies all of these approaches. 
The difference between these models can be illustrated by an example. 
Consider again the statement by which Peggy claims to know the prime fac-
torization of some public integer n. In the [GMR] model, there would be no 
point for her to spend time convincing Vic of this, because Vic knows that it 
is an immediate consequence of her unlimited computing power. In the set-
ting of [Ch4], her secret factorization cannot possibly be unconditionally 
secure once the integer n is made public ; she may therefore just as well con-
vince Vic that she knows the factors by giving them explicitly to Vic. (But if 
Peggy's statement had merely been that she knows non-trivial divisors of n, 
and if n is the product of several primes, the setting of [Ch4] would allow 
Peggy to convince Vic of her knowledge without disclosing any information as 
to which divisors she knows, even if Vic has unlimited computing power.) 
In the context of [BC2], on the other hand, it makes perfect sense for Peggy 
to wish to convince Vic of her knowledge via a protocol that does not disclose 
anything that could help Vic compute the factors of n. In other words, the 
protocol is designed to make Vic's factoring task just as difficult after the pro-
tocol as it was before. 
As we shall see in section 7, it is also interesting to distinguish between 
the parties' available computing resources during and after the protocol. Our 
main result is a protocol that is unconditionally secure for both parties as long 
as Peggy is incapable of factoring a large integer (or extracting a discrete loga-
rithm, or both simultaneously) while the protocol is taking place. Once the 
protocol is over, it is too late for either party to attempt any kind of cheating, 
regardless of their computing power. This is in sharp contrast with the result 
of [GMW, BCI] concerning NP-complete problems, which allows Vic to take 
as much time as he likes in attempts to extract Peggy's secret by deciphering 
the protocol's transcript off-line. 
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2. The Basic Protocol 
Assume Peggy knows a satisfying assignment of truth values for some Boolean 
formula. The basic protocol allows Peggy to convince Vic that she knows 
such an assignment without revealing any information about it. This protocol 
follows the lines of [Ch4]. (Other constructions are given in [GMW, BC2], but 
[GMW] requires a reduction to a graph colouring problem and [BC2] requires 
that blobs satisfy additional properties.) As an example, consider the Boolean 
formula 
v = [(p and q) xor (q or r)] and [(r xor q) or (p and r)] 
and let <p =true, q =false, r =true> be Peggy's secret satisfying assign-
ment. (Of course, this is a toy example since it would be too easy for Vic or 
anyone else to find out how to satisfy such a simple Boolean formula.) 
As a first step, Peggy and Vic agree on the layout of a Boolean circuit to 
compute v. For simplicity, we use only basic binary gates and negations in 
the circuit. (Of course, negations are not needed, since any Boolean formula 
can be rewritten efficiently using only "NAND" gates.) The circuit for v is 
illustrated in figure 1. In addition, this figure shows Peggy's satisfying assign-
ment and the truth table of each gate (except the negation gates). Observe 
that one row is outlined in each truth table, corresponding to the circuit's 
computation on Peggy's satisfying assignment. Seeing the rows outlined is 
enough to easily verify that v is satisfiable. This is achieved by simple 
independent checks on the consistency of each wire. For instance, the output 
of the top left "AND" gate is 0, which is indeed the first input of the middle 
row "EXCLUSIVE-OR" gate. Also, the first input to the top left and top right 
"AND" gates is the same, as it should be since they correspond to the same 
input variable. Finally, the output of the final gate is 1. Notice that seeing 
these outlined rows also gives away the corresponding satisfying assignment 
(even if it were not written explicitly). The basic protocol allows Peggy to 
convince Vic that she knows how to so outline one row in each truth table -
without revealing any information about which rows they are. 
This is achieved by an interactive protocol consisting of several rounds. 
In each round, Peggy "scrambles" the circuit's truth tables and commits to a 
corresponding collection of blobs. At this point, Vic issues one of two possi-
ble challenges to Peggy : one challenge requires Peggy to show that the blobs 
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Figure 1. A Boolean circuit with explicit truth tables and rows outlined. 
really encode a valid scrambling of the circuit's truth tables; the other chal-
lenge requires Peggy to open the rows that would be outlined, assuming it is a 
valid scrambling. The challenges are thus designed in such a way that Peggy 
could meet both of them only if she knew how to satisfy the circuit, but 
answering either one of them yields no information about how. Because 
Peggy cannot predict ahead of time which challenges will be issued by Vic, 
each round increases Vic's confidence in Peggy. In fact, Peggy would be 
caught cheating with probability at least 50% in each round if she were not 
able to answer both possible challenges, so that she could only hope to fool 
Vic"in k successive rounds with exponentially vanishing probability 2-k. 
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We call such techniques "cut-and-choose" because each round is similar 
to the classic "protocol" by which two children split a piece of cake ---one of 
them cuts and the other one chooses. The great utility of a cut-and-choose 
like ours is that it gives an exponential increase in security at the cost of only 
a linear increase in the number of rounds. The earliest use of such cut-and-
choose we know of in the context of cryptographic protocols was presented by 
Rabin in 1977 [R2]. 
The "scrambling" of each truth table by Peggy consists of a random row 
permutation and column complementation. Let us illustrate this principle 
with an example. Figure 2(a) shows the truth table for the Boolean conjunc-
tion ("AND"). The rows of this table are randomly permuted to yield the 
table given in figure 2(b). (Each of the 24 possible permutations - including 
the identity permutation - may be chosen with uniform probability.) Then, 
one bit is randomly chosen for each of the three columns of the truth table. 
Finally, each column is complemented if and only if its corresponding ran-
dom bit is a I, as shown in the three interveaning tables. The final result is 
illustrated in figure 2( c ). Notice that the whole scrambled truth table can still 
unmistakably be recognized as representing the Boolean conjunction (pro-
vided the complementation bits, shown within circles throughout the draw-
ings, are specified). 
b 
Figure 2. Permutation and complementation of a truth table. 
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The complementations must be chosen consistently : all truth table 
columns corresponding to the same wire in the circuit must either all1)e com-
plemented or all remain the same. This is achieved by choosing randomly 
and independently the complementation bits corresponding to each wire. 
(For simplicity, we never complement the output of the final gate.) Figure 3 
gives the result of random permutations and complementations of the truth 
tables in our original circuit from figure 1. 
Figure 3. A circuit with randomly permuted and complemented truth tables. 
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After producing a circuit similar to that of figure 3, Peggy commits to it: 
for each truth table bit, Peggy commits to a blob that she knows how --to open 
accordingly. (It is not necessary for her to actually commit to the comple-
mentation bits, but they must remain secret for the moment.) Coming back 
to our previous example blobs, one may think of Peggy having drawn figure 3 
on the floor but having covered its bits with opaque tape before allowing Vic 
to look. Now that the "cut" is completed by Peggy, it is time for Vic to 
"choose": Vic asks Peggy to convince him of her good faith by requesting 
Figure 4. Showing the existence of a satisfying assignment. 
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that she answers, at his random choice, either Challenge "A" or 
Challenge "B", defined as follows : ~ 
• If the challenge is "A", Peggy must open each and every blob she just 
committed to. Moreover, she must also reveal all the complementation 
bits that she used in the scrambling process. Continuing our intuitive 
image, Peggy strips off all the tape in order to show Vic the equivalent of 
figure 3. This allows Vic to verify that the information concealed by the 
blobs corresponds to valid permutations and complementations of the 
Boolean circuit's truth tables. 
• If the challenge is "B", Peggy opens only the blobs corresponding to one 
row in each truth table. The rows to be opened are precisely those that 
were outlined in figure 1 in their (probably) new location determined by 
the row permutations. Still continuing our image, Peggy selectively strips 
off pieces of tape in order to show Vic the equivalent of figure 4. This 
allows Vic to verify the consistency of each wire and the fact that the 
final output of the circuit is a I bit. 
3. Proof of the Basic Protocol 
Three requirements must be satisfied in order to prove correctness of the basic 
protocol ; the following must hold except perhaps with an exponentially small 
probability: 
1) Peggy can carry out her share of the protocol, provided she knows a 
satisfying assignment for i'. (Of course, no protocol could possibly force 
Vic to be convinced, even giving him the satisfying assignment in the 
clear, because he can always refuse to listen.) 
2) If Peggy does not know a satisfying assignment for '1', no matter how she 
pretends to follow the protocol, Vic will catch her cheating. 
3) If Peggy knows a satisfying assignment for v and if she faithfully follows 
her share of the protocol, she does not reveal anything to Vic that could 
help him determine her satisfying assignment (or even find partial infor-
mation about it) - this remains true even if Vic deviates arbitrarily from 
his stipulated behaviour in the protocol. 
, Defining properties (i) and (ii) of blobs allow Peggy to commit to blobs 
and open them as needed. Also anyone can randomly permute the rows and 
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complement the columns of a truth table, and thus obtain the equivalent of 
figure 3. Knowing a satisfying assignment for '11 allows Peggy to outline one 
row in each of the scrambled truth tables. She can do this simply by 
remembering which columns are complemented and where the random truth 
table permutations have taken the rows she knows would be outlined in the 
originally agreed circuit. Thus, the first requirement is satisfied. 
The second requirement is satisfied because of the bit commitment pro-
perty (ii) of the blobs. Assume Peggy does not know how to satisfy '11. In 
any given round, she can either commit to genuine permutations and comple-
mentations of the original circuit's truth tables (similar to figure 3), or she can 
commit to something phoney. In the first case, she cannot meet 
Challenge "B" without knowing a satisfying assignment for '11 ; in the second 
case, she cannot meet Challenge "A" without breaking the bit commitment 
property of blobs. Therefore, as long as she cannot predict the challenges to 
be issued by Vic, she has at least a 50% chance of being caught in each round. 
As mentioned earlier, her probability of fooling Vic ink successive rounds is 
therefore at best 2-k. 
The reason why the third requirement is satisfied is more subtle. Let us 
first argue that Vic cannot learn anything about the satisfying assignment 
(beyond the fact that Peggy knows it) from seeing either figure 3 or figure 4 
alone. If he issues Challenge "A" and thus gets to see figure 3, he obtains 
randomly permuted and complemented versions of the agreed circuit's truth 
tables. This is of no possible use to Vic because he could have produced such 
a figure just as well by himself (even if the Boolean formula were not 
satisfiable). On the other hand, if he issues Challenge "B" in order to see 
figure 4, what he gets amounts to the result of applying a true one-time pad 
(Peggy's independent random complementations) on the Boolean values car-
ried by the circuit wires while it computes a satisfying assignment (except for 
the final output wire, which should carry the value 1 ). Since such a one-time 
pad hides all information, this gives no advantage either in finding the 
assignment. In other words, it is only by matching a figure 4 with its 
corresponding figure 3 that would allow Vic to learn something about the 
satisfying assignment, but of course Peggy will never answer both challenges 
in th$! same round. 
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Thanks to defining property (iii) of blobs, Vic is prevented from match-
ing any figure 4 he can get by asking Challenge "B" with its corresponding 
figure 3. (Property (iii) is not relevant when Vic asks for Challenge "A" since 
in this case Peggy opens all the blobs involved in the corresponding round.) 
Finally, property (iv) prevents Vic from learning anything about Peggy's 
secret satisfying assignment from the processes by which Peggy commits to 
and opens blobs. 
Even though the third requirement is satisfied, this does not in general 
imply that Vic cannot obtain anything beyond the fact that Peggy genuinely 
knows a satisfying assignment for '1'. For instance, it is possible that only 
Peggy has the technology or knowledge necessary to commit to these blobs, in 
which case Vic might obtain something he could not have produced himself 
- although not the satisfying assignment. A more interesting situation 
occurs if one considers a variation on the basic protocol in which all the 
rounds are carried out in parallel : Peggy commits all at once to blobs 
corresponding to k circuits similar to figure 3, Vic sends his string of chal-
lenges, and Peggy opens the blobs as requested by the challenges. (This 
would be more efficient in some settings.) The modified protocol makes it 
possible for Vic to choose his challenges as a function of the entire collection 
of blob commitments. Although this cannot provide him with any advantage 
in discovering Peggy's satisfying assignment, it might allow him to subse-
quently convince others that '11 is satisfiable by showing them the transcript of 
his conversation with Peggy (see section 6.1.2 for an example of this situa-
tion.) In other words, the parallel version of the basic protocol remains 
minimum disclosure, but it may not be "zero-knowledge" in the terminology 
of [GMR]. 
Intuitively, a protocol is zero-knowledge if the third requirement is 
strengthened to the effect that Vic cannot obtain anything at all beyond learn-
ing that Peggy knows a satisfying assignment. More precisely, Vic must be 
able to simulate his entire conversation with Peggy without in reality ever 
talking to her. Refer to [GMR] for a formal definition. Nevertheless, our 
basic protocol is zero-knowledge provided blob defining property (iv) is 
strengthened to make sure that Vic does not gain anything from the process 
by which Peggy commits to blobs and that he obtains only the intended bits 
from the process by which Peggy opens some of them. Following the proof 
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techniques of [GMR], we say that the blobs are simulatable if, in addition to 
properties (i), (ii) and (iii), they satisfy ~ 
iv') Vic can simulate what he would have been provided in the process 
by which Peggy commits to blobs that she could open as 0 and to 
blobs that she could open as 1. He can also simulate the process 
by which she would open these blobs had she committed to them 
herself. 
Note that this new property implies the original (iv) since Vic must be 
able to simulate the commitment and opening of blobs even if he does not 
know Peggy's secret. If simulatable blobs are used, it is easy for Vic to 
attempt simulating one round of the protocol without talking to Peggy, except 
that he will fail with probability 50%. In order to do this, Vic proceeds as fol-
lows: 
• he flips a fair coin to decide whether he will be prepared to answer 
Challenge "A" or Challenge "B"; 
• he randomly generates a figure 3 or a figure 4, depending on the outcome 
of the coin flip ; 
e he uses property (iv') to simulate Peggy committing to a sequence of 
blobs for which he knows how she would proceed to open them to show 
whichever figure (3 or 4) he has just prepared. 
• he then (honestly ! ) asks himself which challenge he would issue at this 
point if he had just received all these blob commitments from the real 
Peggy; and 
• if he asked himself the challenge he can meet, he simulates Peggy open-
ing the relevant blobs - otherwise he fails. 
The crucial point is that defining property (iii) of blobs ensures that there is 
no correlation between the challenge Vic decided he would be ready to meet 
and the challenge he actually issues to himself. In order to simulate the whole 
k-round protocol, Vic must repeat the above an average of 2k times, pretend-
ing that the unlucky rounds never happened. 
This reasoning does not extend in general to the parallel version of the 
protocol. Assume for simplicity that blobs are bit strings and that Peggy 
" commits to a blob by showing it in the clear. Consider the following strategy 
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for Vic : after receiving from Peggy blobs corresponding to all k circuits with 
randomly permuted and complemented truth tables, he concatenates these 
blobs together and uses the result as input to some one-way function. He 
then uses the first k bits of the output of this function to determine the k 
challenges to be issued. If Vic tries to adapt directly the above technique in 
order to simulate this protocol, the one-way function creates a dependency 
between the challenges that he is ready to meet and those that he actually 
issues to himself, resulting in an exponentially small probability of success. 
Even though running the protocol with Peggy does not help Vic in learning 
anything about Peggy's secret, its transcript may enable him to convince 
someone else of the existence of this secret, because Vic could almost certainly 
not have produced the transcript otherwise. This leads to a curious 
phenomenon : the transcript of a parallel version of the protocol may contain 
no information on Peggy's secret (in the sense of Shannon's information 
theory [S]), yet it can be used to convince someone else of the secret's 
existence ! In other words, the parallel version of the protocol is minimum 
disclosure but it may not be zero-knowledge even if simulatable blobs are 
used. 
If it is important that the protocol be carried out in parallel (perhaps for 
reasons of efficiency), it remains zero-knowledge provided defining property 
(iv) is strengthened further. We say that the blobs are chameleon if, in addi-
tion to properties (i), (ii) and (iii), they satisfy: 
iv") Vic can simulate what he would have seen in the process by which 
Peggy commits to blobs. Moreover, for each of these blobs, Vic 
can simulate both the process by which Peggy would open it as a 0 
and the process by which she would open it as a 1. 
In other words, chameleon blobs allow Vic to do just what property (ii) 
prevents Peggy from doing. Even if Peggy and Vic have similar computing 
abilities, as we shall see in section 6.1, this property can sometimes be 
achieved if Vic has additional information. The advantage of chameleon 
blobs is that they allow Vic to simulate in a straightforward way his entire 
conversation with Peggy, without ever encountering failures. Again, this 
remains true even if Vic deviates arbitrarily from his stipulated behaviour. In 
our•context, however, there is only one way in which Vic can deviate without 
Peggy stopping the protocol altogether : it is by choosing which challenges to 
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issue in a way that depends on Peggy's blob commitments rather than choos-
ing them randomly. However, no such strategy is of any use to Vic with 
chameleon blobs. 
In order to simulate the parallel version of the protocol, Vic simulates 
Peggy's commitment to as many blobs as she would use. Because the blobs 
are chameleon, Vic does not need to have already decided in which way he 
expects Peggy to be able to open them. At this point, Vic looks at these com-
mitments and chooses his challenges exactly as if the commitments actually 
came from Peggy. Whenever he chooses Challenge "A", he randomly per-
mutes and complements the Boolean circuit's truth tables to produce some-
thing like figure 3, and he "opens" all the corresponding blobs accordingly. 
Whenever he chooses Challenge "B", he randomly selects one row in each 
truth table and one Boolean value for each wire in the circuit (except that he 
always selects 1 for the value of the final output wire); he then "opens" the 
blobs in these rows to reflect the value chosen for the corresponding wires, 
thus producing something like figure 4. 
4. A Complexity Theoretic Point of View 
Because satisfiability of Boolean formulas is NP-complete [Co, GJ], the basic 
protocol can be used to supply minimum disclosure proofs of knowledge for 
any positive statement concerning a language Lin NP. Assume without loss 
of generality that L k ~*, where ~ stands for {O, 1} (i.e., elements of L con-
sist of binary strings). By the definition of NP, there exists a "proof system" 
Q k L X ~* such that 
e (\txEL){3cE~*)[jcj ~p(jxj) and <x, c > EQ] 
for some fixed polynomial p, where Ix I denotes the length of x ; and 
e there exists a polynomial-time (deterministic) algorithm capable of decid-
ing, given x and c, whether < x, c > E Q. 
In other words, whenever x EL, there exists a succinct "certificate" c to this 
effect, and one can efficiently verify that c is a valid proof that x EL. Using 
our terminology, such a c is what we called "verifiable information" to the 
effect that x EL. 
Using Cook's theorem [Co], both Peggy and Vic can efficiently build 
from' any x E~* a Boolean formula '11 L(x) satisfiable if and only if x EL. 
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Moreover, because the proof of Cook's theorem is constructive, it is enough 
for Peggy to know some succinct c such that < x, c > E Q in 1'.frder to 
efficiently deduce a satisfying assignment for '11 L(x ). 
Therefore, if L ENP, x EL and if Peggy knows a succinct certificate c to 
the effect that x EL, then Peggy can use the basic protocol to convince Vic 
that '11 L(x) is satisfiable, hence that x EL and that she knows how to prove it. 
This is a minimum disclosure protocol assuming of course that Vic already 
knows the proof system for L and our basic protocol (otherwise, much inf or-
mation is given to Vic when Peggy instructs him about these). For most prac-
tical applications, it is better to think of an ad hoe verifying circuit, rather 
than building it through the machinery of Cook's theorem. 
As pointed out by [FFS], one may prefer not to call this type of protocol 
"zero-knowledge" because Vic does gain knowledge from running it - in par-
ticular, he learns that x EL. Following [GHY], this is why we use the word 
"minimum" rather than "zero": Vic learns that x EL, as intended, but not 
the proof of this fact. We use "disclosure" rather that "knowledge" because 
Vic may gain additional knowledge in general if the blobs are not simulatable 
or if the protocol is carried out in parallel. 
It is interesting to consider both restrictions and extensions of NP in the 
context of minimum disclosure proofs of knowledge. 
The interesting restriction concerns languages L ENP n co-NP. In this 
case, one can construct for each x E~* two Boolean formulae AL(x) and 
BL(x) such that exactly one of them is satisfiable (AL(x) if xEL and BL(x) if 
x fl.L). Clearly, their disjunction CL(x) = [AL(x) or BL(x)] is always 
satisfiable. Assume now that Peggy knows whether x EL or not, and that she 
has the corresponding succinct NP certificate. This gives her a satisfying 
assignment for either AL(x) or BL(x), whichever is satisfiable, hence she can 
also satisfy C L(x ). Consider what happens if she uses our basic protocol to 
convince Vic that she knows a satisfying assignment for CL(x ). Clearly, this 
does not disclose anything about x to Vic (because CL(x) is always 
satisfiable). However, it convinces Vic that Peggy knows whether x EL or 
not, and that she can prove it. This issue and its applications to identification 
systems are discussed in [FFS], but such systems must be used with caution 
becctuse they are not always as secure as it may seem [BBDGQ]. 
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Minimum disclosure protocols can also extend beyond NP if we allow 
the certifying procedure to be probabilistic. Recall that BPP stands-for the 
class of decision problems that can be solved in probabilistic polynomial time 
with bounded error probability [G]. It is reasonable to consider BPP as the 
real class of tractable problems (rather than P) because the error probability 
can always be decreased below any threshold 8 > 0 by repeating the algorithm 
alog8- 1 times and taking the majority answer, where the constant a depends 
only on the original error probability [BB]. It is generally believed that there 
is no inclusion relation either way between NP and BPP : non-determinism 
and randomness seem to be uncomparable powers. These powers can be 
combined in several ways. We consider Babai's class MA [Ba] to be the most 
natural, but we prefer calling it NBPP. This class is such that 
NP u BPP k NBPP, hence NP is almost certainly a strict subset of NBPP. 
The class NBPP is defined exactly as NP, except that we are satisfied 
with a BPP algorithm for deciding, given x and c, whether < x, c > E Q (i.e., 
we only require that Q EBPP). Whenever < x, c > EQ, we now refer to c as 
a convincing argument for the fact that x EL (we no longer call it a certificate 
because it cannot be verified with certainty in general). 
Section 5 shows how to obtain nearly minimum disclosure protocols for 
any language L in NBPP. As is usual in this paper, we assume that both 
Peggy and Vic have "reasonable" computing power and similar algorithmic 
knowledge, but that Peggy is initially given a succinct convincing argument c 
to the effect that x EL. This allows Peggy to initially convince herself beyond 
any reasonable doubt that x EL, by running the BPP algorithm on input 
< x, c >. The purpose of our protocol is for Peggy to convince Vic that she 
knows such a c, without disclosing anything that could help him find it. 
The class NBPP is Babai's class MA, which he defined for his "Arthur-
Merlin games" [Ba] (and similar to Papadimitriou's "stochastic satisfiability" 
in his "games against nature" [Pa]). According to Babai, his other class AM 
is a better candidate for the generalization of NP to probabilistic computa-
tions. In particular, he proved that MA k AM. The interest in AM is further 
increased by the proof that, for any fixed k ~ 2, AM = IP(k ), the class of 
languages that allow an interactive protocol with no more thank rounds [GS]. 
All these considerations are theoretically very compelling. 
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We claim nonetheless that MA (i.e., NBPP) is a more natural class for 
practical purposes, at least in cryptographic settings. If LE NBPP and x EL, 
it is enough for Peggy to know one succinct convincing argument c to this 
effect. In practice, it is not necessary that this c be God-given to Peggy. As 
mentioned earlier, it is easy for some languages to generate both x and the 
corresponding c by a probabilistic process. Consider for instance the set B of 
integers having exactly two prime factors. If Peggy generates two distinct ran-
dom integers p and q that pass a probabilistic primality test [SS, Rl] to her 
satisfaction, she is convinced that n = pq is a member of B and her convinc-
ing argument is < p, q >. The protocol given in section 5 allows her to con-
vince Vic that n EB without disclosing anything else that might help him fac-
tor n. (In this case, B ENP because the set of primes is in NP [Pr]. This does 
not reduce the practical interest of our example, however, because Peggy may 
find it prohibitive to convert her NBPP convincing argument < p, q > into 
an NP certificate <p, c(p), q, c(q) >,where c(•) stands for an NP certificate 
that • is prime. This remark remains true in practice despite the results of 
[GK,AH].) 
By contrast, it is not clear that Peggy can reasonably be asked to carry 
out an AM protocol - regardless of minimum disclosure considerations -
even if she were initially given a succinct piece of advice : an AM protocol 
would in general require Peggy to determine an NP-like certificate as a func-
tion of a random string supplied by Vic. This is a pity in some sense because 
it is trivial that our basic protocol allows the transformation of any AM pro-
tocol into a minimum disclosure one. As explained in [GMW], this is true 
because once "Arthur" has given "Merlin" his coin flips, it "only" remains for 
Merlin to satisfy an NP statement, which can be done without disclosing any-
thing else if the basic protocol of section 2 is used with simulatable blobs. 
5. Going Beyond NP: the Probabilistic Case 
Consider any language LENBPP. Let x be such that Peggy knows a succinct 
convincing argument c to the effect that x EL. Because c is not an NP 
certificate, Peggy is not absolutely certain that x EL, but she can reduce her 
probability of error below any desired threshold by the virtues of BPP. The 
purpose of the minimum disclosure protocol described in this section is for 
Peggy to convince Vic that x EL and that she knows a convincing argument 
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to this effect, but in a way that does not help Vic determine this convincing 
argument or any information about it. If the underlying blobs are simulat-
able, we call this process a "non-transitive transfer of confidence" because it 
convinces Vic that x EL (a statement about which Peggy is convinced already) 
in a way that he cannot subsequently convince anyone else. 
Note that Vic could be fooled by this process in several different ways. 
It can be that Peggy is dishonest and that she does not really know a convinc-
ing argument to the effect that x EL, but that she succeeds (with exponentially 
small probability) in fooling Vic by being lucky enough to each time be asked 
the only challenge she is capable of answering (exactly as she could have done 
with the basic deterministic protocol). It is also possible that Peggy is honest 
but wrong in her belief (because the certifying BPP algorithm mislead her). 
In this case, it is most likely that Peggy will discover her mistake as a result of 
trying to convince Vic, but it is also possible that the certifying algorithm will 
err once more. Finally, it is possible that Peggy is honest and correct in her 
claim, but that when she runs the protocol with Vic the verdict comes out 
wrong due to an error of the certifying algorithm. 
As a preliminary step, Peggy and Vic agree on the error probability 8 
they are willing to tolerate for the certifying algorithm. From this agreement, 
they modify the algorithm so that its probability of error does not exceed 6 
(for this, they first determine how many times the original algorithm must be 
repeated so that the majority answer is almost certainly correct [BB]). From 
now on, we assume without loss of generality that the probability of error of 
the certifying algorithm is negligible. 
Intuitively, Peggy wants to convince Vic that she knows some secret 
input c such that the certifying algorithm will (almost certainly) accept the 
input < x, c >. Let n and m denote the size of x and c, respectively. 
Assume for simplicity, and without loss of generality, that the value of m is 
uniquely determined as a known (easy to compute) function of n, so that 
there is no need for the protocol to hide the value of m from Vic. Let r be an 
upper bound on the number of coin flips that the certifying algorithm can 
perform on any input < x, c >, where c is of size m. An argument similar to 
the proof of Cook's theorem shows that this gives rise to a Boolean formula it 
with~at least m + r variables. If the first m variables of this formula are set to 
represent the binary string c and the next r variables are determined by 
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independent random coin flips, then (except with probability at most ~) it is 
easy to set the other variables (if any) so as to satisfy the whole formula if 
and only if c is a valid convincing argument that x EL. This formula can be 
constructed from knowledge of x and of the certifying procedure, with no 
need for the secret convincing argument c. Hence, it can be made public. As 
before, it is converted into a Boolean circuit on which both Peggy and Vic 
agree. 
The basic minimum disclosure protocol of section 2 cannot be used 
directly, because Vic cannot trust Peggy to choose the r appropriate inputs 
truly at random. On the other hand, Peggy cannot allow Vic to choose these 
variables either, because a careful choice might allow Vic to obtain inf orma-
tion on Peggy's secret convincing argument c. It is therefore necessary to use 
a,min flipping sub-protocol to set these inputs to random values not under 
the control of either party. Moreover, Vic should not be allowed to see the 
outcome of the coin flips, again to prevent him from learning information 
about c (i.e., coin flipping should be performed "in a well" [BI]). In order to 
allow Peggy to use these coin flips without ever showing their outcome to Vic, 
it is necessary that the coin flipping protocol produce blob commitments 
rather than simply bits. Finally, Peggy must not be allowed to choose her c 
as a function of the coin flips. 
It is much easier to implement all these requirements if we ask that blobs 
have two additional properties : 
v) Given two unopened blobs that she has committed to, Peggy can 
convince Vic that she could open them to show the same bit (pro-
vided this is so) without disclosing any additional information. 
vi) Given two unopened blobs that she has committed to, Peggy can 
convince Vic that she could open them to show distinct bits (pro-
vided this is so) without disclosing anything else. 
As we shall see in section 6.5, however, property (vi) is always a consequence 
of properties (i) through (v), and property (v) is itself a consequence of pro-
perties (i) through (iv). 
Coin flipping capable of producing a blob is trivial to implement with 
prop~rty (vi): Peggy commits to two blobs that she can open to show distinct 
bits, she convinces Vic that this is so, and she asks him to choose one of 
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them. When Vic makes his choice, the coin flip is determined and Peggy 
knows its outcome - which is the bit she could show by opening the blob 
chosen by Vic. However, Vic cannot tell how it went unless Peggy subse-
quently opens this blob (which she will never do in the protocol below). Pro-
perty (iii) prevents Vic from influencing the coin flip, and properties (ii) and 
(vi) prevent Peggy from doing so. 
We are now ready to describe our general protocol for the case of proba-
bilistically verifiable information. Recall that Peggy and Vic have agreed on a 
Boolean circuit corresponding to the certifying algorithm intended to proba-
bilistically verify Peggy's secret convincing argument c that x EL. At this 
point, Peggy commits once and for all to her convincing argument by commit-
ting to m blobs that she could open to show the bits of c. Then, Peggy and 
Vic flip r coins "in a well" by the above procedure, which results in r blob 
commitments corresponding to the outcome of the coin flips. It only remains 
for Peggy to a use a slight variation on the basic protocol of section 2 to con-
vince Vic that she knows how to select the other inputs of the circuit (if any) 
so as to satisfy it. 
The basic protocol must be modified in order to force Peggy to use the 
proper bits for the inputs corresponding to c and to the the coin flips, but this 
must be achieved without disclosing anything that could help Vic learn about 
the value of these bits. We illustrate how this can be done with the example 
of section 2. Assume that Peggy has committed to some blob b (which she 
could open as 1, but Vic does not know this). Peggy wishes to convince Vic 
that she knows a satisfying assignment for it in which the first input 
corresponds to the bit she could open as blob b. For this purpose, Peggy ran-
domly permutes and complements the Boolean circuit's truth tables to pro-
duce a figure 3, and she commits to it exactly as before. Moreover, for each 
input bit that Peggy has committed to (the first input bit in our example, the 
first m + r bits in general), she now commits to the complementation bit used 
on the corresponding wire to produce the current figure 3. 
If Vic issues Challenge "A", Peggy opens each and every blob she just 
committed to and she reveals all the complementation bits used, thus showing 
figure 3 to Vic, still exactly as in the deterministic basic protocol. If Vic 
issues Challenge "B", however, she must do more than showing figure 4 to 
Vic (which would say nothing about the first Boolean variable of the 
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satisfying assignment). Because the wire corresponding to the first input is set 
to 0 in figure 4 (as shown by the first bit in the outlined row of the-lop left 
truth table), Peggy uses property (v) to convince Vic that she could open the 
blob associated with the corresponding wire complementation in the same 
way as she could open blob b. If the wire corresponding to this input had 
been a 1, she would of course have used property (vi) instead. 
This completes the description of our protocol for the case of probabilist-
ically verifiable information. In general, however, it is not a minimum disclo-
sure protocol from a theoretical point of view. The subtle difficulty is that 
different convincing arguments may cause the certifying procedure to fail with 
different probabilities. Because he is generally unable to predict the failure 
probability, Vic cannot simulate exactly the conversation that would take 
place if he were really talking to Peggy. Moreover, running the protocol an 
exponentially large number of times with Peggy could in principle allow a 
very powerful Vic to increase his chances to guess correctly Peggy' s secret (by 
keeping a tally of how many times the protocol showed a failure of the certi-
fying algorithm). For all practical purposes, however, this threat is of no 
consequence if B is chosen small enough, and the protocol can thus be used 
safely. 
A variation on this scheme is almost always minimum disclosure, but it is 
usually more time consuming. To achieve this, the original BPP certifying 
algorithm has to be modified, by repeating it enough times and taking the 
majority, so that all but exponentially few of the random choices may cause it 
to give the wrong answer on even a single input. The fact that this is possible 
can be proven by a refinement of the proof that MA ~ AM [Ba]. This allows 
use of the basic protocol from section 2 almost directly, with no need for the 
coin tossing to be in a well or for blob properties (v) and (vi). 
6. Blob Implementations 
We have taken the existence of blobs for granted in the previous sections. Let 
us now see how they can be implemented in practice. This can be done in 
several ways. None of these implementations is ideal, however. The choice of 
implementation should be based on the particular requirements of the appli-
cati9n. The safety of most of the following implementations depends on 
unproved assumptions about the computational difficulty of solving particular 
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problems. Section 7 compares the advantages and drawbacks of these various 
approaches. ~ 
As an elementary (but probably not very secure) example, consider two 
isomorphic graphs G and H upon which Peggy and Vic agree. Assume that 
Peggy is convinced that they are isomorphic, but that she does not actually 
know an isomorphism between them. Suppose further that she is computa-
tionally incapable of finding such an isomorphism in a reasonable amount of 
time. (Let us postpone until section 6.1.3 the question of how Peggy could be 
convinced that the graphs are isomorphic, without herself explicitly knowing 
an isomorphism.) In this setting, Peggy agrees with Vic that any graph for 
which she can show an isomorphism with G (resp. H) is a commitment to the 
bit 0 (resp. 1 ). Referring to the defining properties of blobs, property (i) 
holds because Peggy can commit to the bit 0 (resp. 1) by randomly permuting 
the vertices of G (resp. H) and showing the resulting graph - the blob - to 
Vic. In order to open a blob, it suffices for Peggy to show Vic the isomor-
phism she knows with G or H, whichever is the case. Property (ii) holds if 
and only if Peggy cannot find an isomorphism between G and H while the 
protocol is in progress. (More precisely, in order for Peggy to break property 
(ii), she must have obtained information that makes it easy for her to discover 
such an isomorphism.) Property (iii) holds unconditionally because blobs 
used by Peggy as commitments to 0 are information theoretically indistin-
guishable from those used as commitments to 1. These blobs are simulatable 
because property (iv') is satisfied : Vic does not need Peggy' s help to permute 
randomly the vertices of G and H. Finally, these blobs are chameleon - pro-
perty (iv") - if and only if Vic knows an isomorphism between G and H. 
As illustrated by this example, it is not the blob itself (some graph iso-
morphic to both G and H) that determines a bit, but rather Peggy's 
knowledge about it (the actual isomorphism known by Peggy between this 
graph and either G or H). Thus, many bit commitment schemes (but not those 
of sections 6.3 and 6.4) consist of two sets, X and Y, together with an 
efficiently computable verification function v : X X Y ~ {O, 1, • }, where "•" 
stands for "undefined" (that is, this y E Y is irrelevant for this x EX). In 
order to commit to bit b E {O, 1 }, Peggy chooses a pair x EX and y E Y such 
that.v(x,y) =b. Here, x is the blob and y is Peggy's additional knowledge 
about it. The actual commitment occurs when Peggy shows x to Vic. In 
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order to open the blob, Peggy shows y to Vic and lets him compute v(x,y). 
For this to be efficient and secure, we need the following properties : ,.------
i) Given b E {O, I}, Peggy can generate pairs x EX and y E Y such that 
P(x,y) =b. 
ii) Peggy cannot obtain any triple x EX, y 0 E Y and y i E Y such that 
v(x,y0) = 0 and v(x,yi) = 1. 
iii) When Peggy gives Vic some x EX, Vic cannot learn anything about 
whether Peggy also knows a y E Y such that v(x, y) = 0 or such that 
P(x,y) = 1. 
iv) The way in which Peggy chooses her pairs < x, y > satisfying pro-
perty (i) is uncorrelated to any secret she wishes to keep from Vic. 
These four requirements are slight restrictions on the corresponding defining 
blob properties of section 1, which is why we continue to refer to them by the 
same symbols. If the blobs are to be simulatable, we must also require that : 
iv') Given b E {O, I}, Vic also can generate pairs x EX and y E Y such 
that v(x, y) = b. Moreover, Vic can generate these pairs with the 
same probability distribution as Peggy would according to property 
(i). 
In particular, it is sufficient for Vic to know the process by which Peggy gen-
erates blobs satisfying property (i) for these blobs to be simulatable. This will 
in fact be the case throughout sections 6.1 and 6.2 but it will not be repeated 
there. Finally, the blobs are chameleon provided that : 
iv") Vic can generate triples x EX, y 0 E Y and Yi E Y such that 
v(x,y0) = 0 and v(x,y 1) = 1. Moreover, the pairs <x,y0> (resp. 
< x, y i >) thus generated are obtained with the same probability 
distribution as the pairs < x, y > that Peggy would generate 
according to property (i) in order to commit to the bit 0 (resp. I). 
There is an apparent contradiction between properties (ii) and (iii). If 
there exist x, y 0 and Yi such that v(x,y0 ) = 0 and v(x,yi) =I, why should 
Peggy be unable to obtain them, and thus violate property (ii)? On the other 
hand, if each x EX unambiguously determines the only possible non-
undefined value for v(x, y ), why should Vic not be able to determine this 
" 
value upon seeing x, and thus violate property (iii) ? 
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We off er several different ways to resolve this. Section 6.1 investigates 
blobs that are unconditionally secure for Peggy (such as the graph isomotphism 
implementation outlined above). In this case, property (iii) holds regardless 
of Vic's computing power. This is achieved by asking that, for every x in X, 
there must exist at least one y 0 and one Yi in Y such that v(x,y0 ) = 0 and 
v(x, y i) = 1. Moreover, the probability that Peggy generates any given blob x 
satisfying property (i) must be the same whether she wishes to commit to 0 or 
to I. These additional requirements clearly imply that Vic cannot learn any-
thing about which way Peggy is able to open any unopened blob she has 
committed to. However, they also imply that Peggy could in principle violate 
property (ii), but our implementations are designed to make this computation-
ally infeasible for her (under suitable assumptions). As a result, these blobs 
are ruled out by the [GMR] model because an infinitely powerful prover 
could always cheat them, but they fit within the models of [Ch4, BC2]. Some 
of these blobs are chameleon, which therefore allows the basic protocol to be 
zero-knowledge even if carried out in parallel, as explained in section 3. 
Section 6.2 investigates blobs that are unconditionally secure for Vic. In 
this case, property (ii) holds regardless of Peggy's computing power. This is 
achieved by asking that, for every x in X, there must not exist simultaneously 
a y 0 and a Yi in Y such that v(x,y0 ) = 0 and v(x,yi) = 1. This additional 
requirement clearly implies that Peggy is irrevocably committed to a specific 
bit each time she utters a blob. However, it also implies that Vic could in 
principle violate property (iii), but our implementations are designed to make 
this computationally infeasible for him (again under suitable assumptions). 
These blobs lead to zero-knowledge interactive protocols in the sense of 
[GMR] and to protocols similar to those of [GMW, BCI]. Of course, none of 
these blobs are chameleon. 
Section 6.3 considers blobs that are secure even if all parties have unlim-
ited computing power. These blobs do not fit the mold of the verification 
function v described earlier. Blobs of section 6.3.1 make use of quantum phy-
sical principles. Using these blobs, it is provably impossible for Vic to obtain 
any information on Peggy's secret (assuming that quantum physics is correct). 
Although quantum blobs could be cheated in principle by Peggy, this would 
require a technology far beyond any foreseeable future. Blobs of section 6.3.2 
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can be used in a multiparty environment under the assumption that the 
honest participants outnumber the cheaters. ~ 
Section 6.4 describes some relation between blobs and conceptually 
simpler primitives such as Rabin's oblivious transfer. This allows us to give 
very weak assumptions for the existence of blobs. These blobs do not fit 
either the mold of verification functions. Depending on the underlying oblivi-
ous transfer capability, we obtain blobs unconditionally secure for Peggy, for 
Vic, or for both of them. 
Given any two blobs Peggy has committed to, section 6.5 shows how she 
can convince Vic of whether she can open them to show the same bit or dis-
tinct bits, whichever is the case, without disclosing anything else. This possi-
bility was used extensively in section 5 (optional properties (v) and (vi)). 
Finally, section 6.6 outlines a potential generalization to multi-valued 
blobs, which allows the efficiency of the basic protocol of section 2 to be 
improved. 
6.1. Blobs unconditionally secure for the Prover 
6.1.1. Based on factoring [BC2) 
Some elementary number theory is necessary to understand this particular 
implementation of blobs. Let n be an integer. Z~ denotes the set of integers 
relatively prime to n between 1 and n - I. An integer x El~ is a quadratic 
residue modulo n if there exists a y EZ~ such that x =y2 (mod n). This is 
denoted as x EQR,,. Such a y is called a square root of x, modulo n. Lets be 
any fixed quadratic residue. A uniformly distributed random quadratic resi-
due can be generated by choosing y El~ at random and computing 
x = y 2s moon. This holds in particular ifs = 1. The crucial fact is that it is 
information theoretically impossible to distinguish a quadratic residue thus pro-
duced using any given sEQRn from one produced using s = 1. 
Now, let n = pq be the product of two distinct odd primes. The problem 
of extracting square roots modulo n is computationally equivalent to the 
problem of factoring n [R3]. We shall assume here that factoring n is almost 
always infeasible when p and q are sufficiently large. Therefore, given n and 
s EQR,, , we assume that it is infeasible to compute a square root of s modulo 
n unless the factorization of n is known. 
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At the outset of the protocol, Vic randomly chooses two distinct large 
primes p and q, and he computes their product n = pq. Vic also cb:Ooses a 
random t EZ! (t =I=+ 1) and computes s = t 2 mod n. Vic gives n and s to 
Peggy. Using a minimum disclosure protocol [Be, BCI], Vic convinces Peggy 
that s is a quadratic residue modulo n and that he knows one of its square 
roots. (Notice that in this initialization phase of the protocol, it is tem-
porarily Vic that takes the role of Prover and Peggy that of Verifier.) 
The blobs are now defined by the sets X = QRn, Y = Z! and 
[ 
0 if x = y 2 (mod n) 
v(x,y) = I if x =y2s (mod n) 
• otherwise . 
Property (i) holds because whenever she wishes to commit to some bit b, 
Peggy randomly chooses ayEZ: and computes x = y 2sh mod n. She gives x 
to Vic but she keeps y secret as her witness that allows her to open blob x as 
bit b. Clearly, any quadratic residue can be used by Peggy as a commitment 
to 0 just as well as to 1, depending only on her knowledge about it. There-
fore, property (iii) holds in a very strong sense : blobs committed to by Peggy 
convey no information on the bits she could show by opening them. Property 
(ii) holds computationally because Peggy could easily obtain a square root of 
s (which we assumed to be infeasible for her) from knowledge of y 0 and y 1 
such thaty02 =y?s (mod n). 
It is obvious that these blobs leave the door wide open for Peggy to 
cheat if she succeeds in extracting a square root of s. It is a more subtle 
observation that there is also a possibility for Vic to cheat and thus learn 
everything about Peggy's secret. In order to achieve this, Vic must be "dar-
ing" from the beginning, because he must give Peggy a quadratic non-residue 
as his s. If he succeeds in convincing Peggy that s is a quadratic residue -
which can only happen with an exponentially small probability - then Peggy 
can open as 0 blobs she has committed to precisely if they are quadratic resi-
dues, a condition that Vic can easily determine with the help of his factoriza-
tion of n. Nevertheless, we classify these blobs as "unconditionally secure for 
Peggy" because only luck can allow Vic to cheat - no amount of computing 
power can help him. 
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In addition, these blobs are chameleon because Vic's knowledge of t, a 
square root of s, allows him to create blobs for which he can simulatePeggy's 
opening as either 0 or 1. To do this, Vic generates a random y El~ and com-
putes x = y 2s mod n and y = yt mod n. He can then simulate Peggy's open-
ing of this blob as a 0 (resp. 1), by usingy (resp. y). 
6.1.2. Based on the discrete logarithm [CDG,BKK) 
Let p be a large prime and let a generate l.'; , the multiplicative group of 
integers modulo p. Given any integer y, it is easy to compute aY mod p, but 
no efficient algorithm is known to invert this process, an operation known as 
computing the "discrete logarithm modulo p ". The intractability assumption 
of the discrete logarithm was used in the very first paper published on 
public-key cryptography [DH]. It can be used also to create blobs provided it 
is strengthened to assume that computing discrete logarithms modulo a large 
prime p remains infeasible even if the factorization of p - I is known. 
At the outset of the protocol, Peggy and Vic agree on a prime number p 
for which both of them know the factorization of p - 1. They also agree on a, 
a generator of the group l.'; . Thanks to their knowledge of the factors of 
p -1, they can both verify with certainty thatp is a prime and that a is a gen-
erator. These same parameters p and a can be public, in the sense that they 
can be used with no breach of security by all parties wishing to engage in 
minimum disclosure protocols. At the outset, Vic also chooses a random 
s El'; (s =I= I) and gives it to Peggy. Assuming the intactability of the discrete 
logarithm, Peggy cannot compute e such that s =ae (mod p). 
The blobs are now defined by the sets X = l.';, Y = {O, 1, 2, ... , p -2} 
and 
v(x,y) 
0 if x =al (mod p) 
I if x =saY (mod p) 
• otherwise . 
Property (i) holds because whenever she wishes to commit to some bit b, 
Peggy randomly chooses a y E Y and computes x = sb aY mod p. She gives x 
to Vic but keeps y secret as her witness that allows her to open blob x as bit 
b. Clearly, any element of l.'; can be used by Peggy as commitment to 0 just 
as well as to 1, depending only on her knowledge about it. Therefore, 
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property (iii) holds unconditionally, as with the implementation of sec-
tion 6.1.1 : blobs committed to by Peggy still contain no inf ormatiorr on the 
way in which she could open them. Property (ii) holds computationally 
because Peggy could easily obtain e (which we assumed to be infeasible for 
her) from knowledge ofy0 andy 1 such that c? 1 =sc?2 (modp). 
Despite a superficial resemblance, there is a fundamental difference 
between this implementation of blobs and that of section 6.1.1. There is no 
longer any possibility for Vic to cheat. The fact that blobs that Peggy can 
open as 0 and blobs that she can open as 1 are information theoretically 
indistinguishable depends only on the fact that p is a prime and that a gen-
erates l.'; , and both are verifiable by Peggy before starting the protocol. 
Using the terminology of [GMW], this implementation of blobs turns the 
basic protocol presented here into a "perfect zero-knowledge interactive pro-
tocol" for satisfiability (except that it does not fit their model as an interactive 
protocol since they allow the Prover to be infinitely powerful, in which case 
she would have no problem computing e - which explains why Fortnow's 
theorem [F] does not apply). Such a perfect zero-knowledge interactive proto-
col was incorrectly claimed in [BC2] about the implementation corresponding 
to the blobs of section 6.1.1. Notice, however, that it is computationally more 
efficient to use the blobs of section 6.1.1. 
Besides efficiency, there is another price to pay for making it impossible 
for Vic to cheat: the "discrete logarithm blobs" are not chameleon, and thus 
the basic protocol should not directly be performed in parallel if it is to be 
zero-knowledge. If it were performed in parallel, Vic could cheat by choosing 
a random integer e and computing 2ae mod p as the s he gives to Peggy. 
Assume Peggy uses the parallel version of the protocol to convince Vic that 
she knows the proof of some theorem T. If Vic uses a one-way function for 
example to select his challenges, he could subsequently use the transcript, 
together with the value of e, to convince others that T is true. Indeed, there 
is no obvious way by which Vic could have created this transcript by himself, 
unless he knows a proof of T or the discrete logarithm of 2. This illustrates a 
very curious phenomenon : although the transcript of the protocol can be 
used as evidence that T is true, it cannot be used in any way to facilitate 
findjng such a proof. Moreover, the transcript contains no information on the 
proof of T, even in the sense of Shannon's information theory [S] ! 
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With some preprocessing, it is possible to add the chameleon property to 
these blobs. Rather than choosing s randomly in z; , Vic randomly-chooses 
an integer e between 1 and p -2 and computes s = ae mod p. Using a 
minimum disclosure protocol [CEGP], he then convinces Peggy that he knows 
the discrete logarithm of s, which is all he needs to meet property (iv''). Note 
that in this case Vic would also convince Peggy that s is in the subgroup gen-
erated by a, so that the requirement that a be a generator of ll; is no longer 
crucial for Peggy's safety. Therefore, if we tolerate an exponentially small 
probability that Vic could gain information on Peggy's secret, the factoriza-
tion of p - I need not be known and thus the assumption about the difficulty 
of computing discrete logarithms can be relaxed. 
6.1.3. Based on graph isomorphism [BC2] 
Define a graph G to be hard if it is computationally infeasible with high pro- · 
bability, given G and a random isomorphic copy of G, to figure out the iso-
morphism. We assume that hard graphs exist and that they can be obtained 
in practice. 
At the outset of the protocol, Peggy and Vic agree on some hard graph 
G = < N, E >. Vic randomly chooses a permutation o : N ~ N and uses it to 
produce H = < N, E' >, where (u, v)EE' if and only if (o(u), o(v))EE. He 
then gives H to Peggy and convinces her that G and H are isomorphic 
without disclosing anything about the isomorphism o [GMW]. By our 
assumption, it is computationally infeasible for Peggy to determine o (or any 
other isomorphism between G and H) in a reasonable amount of time. 
The blobs are now defined by the sets X = { K = < N, E > I K is a 
graph isomorphic to G } , Y = { y : N ~ N I y is a permutation } and 
A 
0 if ( u, v) EE iff ( y( u ), y( v)) EE 
A A 
v(<N,E>,y) 1 if (u, v) EE iff (y(u), y(v))EE' 
• otherwise . 
The reader can easily verify that the defining blob properties all hold, and 
that these blobs are also chameleon. 
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6.2. Blobs unconditionally secure for the Verifier 
6.2.1. Based on quadratic residuosity (BC1) 
To understand these blobs, further elementary number theory is needed. We 
refer the reader to [BCl] for the relevant background. 
At the outset of the protocol, Peggy randomly chooses two distinct large 
primes p and q, and she computes their product n = pq. She also randomly 
chooses a quadratic non-residue s modulo n with Jacobi symbol + I. She dis-
closes n and s to Vic. She then convinces Vic that n has only two prime fac-
tors [PG] and that s is a quadratic non-residue modulo n [GMR, GHY], 
without disclosing any additional information. Following the Quadratic Resi-
duosity Assumption [GM], we assume that Vic cannot distinguish random 
quadratic residues from non-residues with Jacobi symbol +I. 
The blobs are now defined by the sets X = z:r + 1 ], Y = z: , and 
0 if x =y2 (mod n) 
v(x,y) 1 if x =y2s (mod n) 
• otherwise . 
Property (i) holds because whenever she wishes to commit to some bit b, 
Peggy randomly chooses ayEl: and computes x = y 2sh moon. She gives x 
to Vic but keeps y secret as her witness that allows her to open blob x as bit 
b. (Although Peggy's knowledge of the factors of n would allow her to recom-
pute y from x, she saves time and effort by remembering it.) Peggy can open 
x as 0 if and only if it is a quadratic residue. This shows that property (ii) 
holds unconditionally because any given x is either a quadratic residue or not. 
Property (iii), however, holds only computationally because we have assumed 
that testing quadratic residuosity is infeasible for Vic. 
6.2.2. Based on the discrete logarithm 
Let p be a large prime, let a generate l'; and let u be the smallest integer such 
that 2" does not divide p - 1. Given any s El'; , it is easy to compute the 
u - 1 least-significant bits of the unique e such that 0 :;;;;;, e :;;;;;, p - 2 and 
s = ae (mod p ). Under the intractability assumption of the discrete loga-
rithm, however, it is infeasible to learn anything about the uth least-significant 
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bit of e because this problem is as hard as that of the discrete logarithm itself 
~ ~ 
At the outset of the protocol, Peggy and Vic agree on p and a exactly as 
in section 6.1.2. Let u be as above. The blobs are now defined by the sets 
X = t; , Y = { 0, 1, 2, ... , p - 2} and 
Yu if x =aY (mod p) 
v(x,y) = 
• otherwise , 
where Yu denotes the uth least-significant bit of y. 
Property (i) holds because whenever she wishes to commit to some bit b, 
Peggy randomly chooses a y Et; such that Yu = b and computes 
x = aY mod p. She gives x to Vic but keeps y secret as her witness that 
allows her to open blob x as bit b. (Contrary to section 6.2.1, Peggy must 
remember y in order to open x because she could not recompute it from x.) 
Property (ii) holds unconditionally because a is a generator of t; , hence the 
discrete logarithm of x is uniquely defined. Property (iii) holds from a com-
putational point of view under the strengthened discrete logarithm assumption 
(see section 6.1.2). 
6.2.3. Based on any probabilistic encryption schemes (GMW] 
A probabilistic encryption scheme in the sense of [GM] is a polynomial-time 
computable function f: B X Y ~ X that, on input b EB and "coin tosses" 
y E Y, outputs an encryption f (b, y) of b. Decryption is unique : 
f(b 1 ,y1) = f(b 2 ,y2) implies that b1 = b2 • However, it is assumed to be 
computationally infeasible to learn anything about b from f(b,y) without 
knowledge of some "trap-door" information. 
Taking B = {O, 1 }, we define blobs by 
v(x,y) 
0 if f(O,y) = x 
1 if f(I,y) = x 
• otherwise . 
The reader can easily verify that the defining blob properties all hold. 
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6.3. Blobs that no amount of computing power can break 
6.3.1. Quantum blobs (BB3) 
We assume in this section that the reader is familiar with the principles of 
Quantum Cryptography [BBl, BB2]. Charles H. Bennett has suggested that 
blobs could be implemented with similar principles. Indeed, quantum blobs 
can be implemented by a process very similar to quantum coin-tossing [BB2], 
which we do not repeat here. Let us only say that it can be proven that any 
cheating successfully conducted by Vic would lead to an apparatus capable of 
transmitting information faster than the speed of light. In principle, the 
Einstein-Rosen-Podolsky "paradox" [EPR, M] allows Peggy to cheat, exactly 
as with the coin-tossing protocol, but the technology needed to perform this 
cheating is far beyond any foreseeable future. More details are forthcoming 
[BB3). 
6.3.2. Multi-party blobs (CCD) 
Blobs unconditionally secure for all parties can be obtained in a multi-party 
environment, assuming that more than two-thirds of the participants are 
honest - in some cases only one-half suffices - and that each pair of partici-
pants shares a private channel. Even a coalition of nearly a third of the parti-
cipants with unlimited computing power cannot cheat the honest ones. For 
more details, consult [CCD]. 
6.4. Oblivious transfer, ANDOS and blobs 
Oblivious transfer is a powerful tool invented by Rabin [R4]. It involves two 
parties: Sam (the Sender) and Rachel (the Receiver). In its simplest form, 
Sam transmits one bit to Rachel in such a away that she has a 50% chance of 
receiving it. Neither party can influence whether or not the transmission will 
be successful. At the end of the transmission, Rachel knows whether she 
received the transmitted bit, but Sam does not know unless Rachel tells him. 
ANDOS stands for "All-or-Nothing Disclosure of Secrets". It is a tool 
invented by Wiesner [W] and investigated further by Brassard, Crepeau and 
Robert [BCRl, BCR2] and Chaum [Ch3]. Here, Sam owns n secret bit strings 
s 1 , s2 , ••• , Sn • The ANDOS protocol allows Rachel to choose any i, 
1 ~ I ~ n, and obtain s; from Sam in a way that he cannot tell which secret 
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she got. On the other hand, the protocol does not allow Rachel to learn any-
thing about more than one of Sam's secrets. ~ 
The connection between ANDOS and the seemingly simpler oblivious 
transfer is achieved by a sequence of reductions discussed in [BCRl, Cr]: any 
protocol for the oblivious transfer can be transformed efficiently into a proto-
col for ANDOS. Moreover, if the underlying oblivious transfer protocol is 
unconditionally secure for Rachel (that is, there is no way Sam can learn any-
thing without Rachel's help about whether or not the transmitted bit was 
received), then the corresponding ANDOS protocol is also unconditionally 
secure for Rachel (that is, there is no way Sam can learn anything without 
Rachel's help about which secret she requested). 
Blobs can be obtained easily from ANDOS and thus from oblivious 
transfer. For this purpose, Peggy assumes the role of Rachel, and Vic that of 
Sam. When she wants to commit to some bit b, Peggy asks Vic to prepare 
two secret random bit strings s0 and s 1 , and she obtains sb through ANDOS. 
At this point, Vic has no idea whether Peggy knows s0 or s 1 , but she cannot 
know both of them. In order to open the blob, it suffices for Peggy to show 
Vic whichever string she had requested. She has an exponentially small 
chance of guessing the other string if she tries to cheat in opening the blob. 
However, this is no worse than her already existing exponentially small 
chance of not needing to cheat her bit commitments by guessing each time 
which challenge will be asked by Vic in the basic protocol of section 2. 
Blobs can also be obtained directly from oblivious transfer. For this, let 
Peggy assume the role of Sam, and Vic that of Rachel. In order to commit to 
some bit b, Peggy chooses a Boolean matrix M at random, except that the 
parity of the number of l's in each row is equal to b. Peggy then sends Vic in 
some agreed order each bit of M separately by means of oblivious transfer. 
At this point, nothing is revealed about b unless Vic was lucky enough to 
obtain each and every bit in at least one row of M, which is exponentially 
unlikely in the number of columns. In order to open the blob, Peggy gives 
Vic all the bits of M in the clear. Peggy can attempt to cheat by lying about 
one bit in each row, in the hope that none of these bits had been obtained by 
Vic during the oblivious transfer phase, but this is exponentially unlikely in 
the Bumber of rows. 
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The blobs based on ANDOS and those based directly on oblivious 
transfer are duals of each other, just as the blobs described in section--6.1 are 
dual of the blobs described in section 6.2. Assume for instance that the 
underlying oblivious transfer protocol is unconditionally secure for the 
receiver. The blobs based on ANDOS are then unconditionally secure for 
Peggy (as in section 6.1) : nothing Vic can do will enable him to learn any-
thing about the bit committed to by Peggy unless she opens it. On the other 
hand, the blobs based directly on oblivious transfer are unconditionally secure 
for Vic (as in section 6.2) : although Peggy could successfully cheat in opening 
a blob, she can only do this by being extremely lucky - no amount of com-
puting power can help her. Both implementations are unconditionally secure 
for Peggy and Vic (except with exponentially small probability) if the underly-
ing oblivious transfer protocol is unconditionally secure for both parties. 
Even though oblivious transfer is conceptually simpler than bit commit-
ment, it seems to be an inherently more powerful primitive. Indeed, we do 
not know of any construction capable of achieving oblivious transfer only 
from blobs satisfying defining properties (i) through (iv) (although this 
becomes possible if we add an appropriate "trap-door" property to the 
definition of blobs). Moreover, bit commitment is a universal primitive for 
minimum disclosure whereas oblivious transfer is a universal primitive for the 
more general multi-party computation in which several parties have secrets 
[CDG]. 
6.5. Proving blob equality and inequality 
In this section, we address the question of how Peggy can convince Vic, given 
any two blobs she has committed to, that she can open them to show the 
same bit or alternatively that she can open them to show opposite bits, which-
ever is the case, without disclosing anything else. Referring to section 5, we 
distinguish between properties (v), which allows Peggy to convince Vic that 
she can open two blobs to show the same bit (provided this is the case), and 
property (vi), which allows Peggy to convince Vic that she can open two blobs 
to show distinct bits (provided this is the case). 
Several specific implementations of blobs given above (sections 6.1.1, 
6.1.2, 6.1.3 and 6.2.1) allow property (v) to be obtained as a prumt1ve 
,, 
operation. Consider the blobs of section 6.1.1 or 6.2.1, for instance. 
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If x = y 2 sb (mod n) and x = y2 sb (mod n) for the same bit b, then if Peggy 
computes z = yysb mod n and gives it to Vic, the latter will be convineeCl that 
she can open x and x to show the same bit after checking that 
xx =z2 (mod n). However, if we use a general probabilistic encryption 
scheme to implement blobs (section 6.2.3), it is not obvious that property (v) 
is always so easy to obtain. We challenge the reader to figure out how blob 
equality can be achieved with oblivious transfer blobs. 
Although property (vi) is also easy to implement as a primitive operation 
with the blobs of sections 6.1.1, 6.1.2 and 6.2.1, it is intriguing to notice that 
this does not seem to be so with the blobs based on graph isomorphism (sec-
tion 6.1.3). This shows that there is a fundamental difference between proper-
ties (v) and (vi): it is easy for Peggy to convince Vic that she knows an iso-
morphism between two graphs when this is so, but how could she convince 
him that she does not know such an isomorphism? (Notice that this question 
has nothing to do with whether or not graph non-isomorphism is in NP.) 
Even though they may not always be achieved as primitive operations, it 
turns out that properties (v) and (vi) can always be obtained through an 
interactive sub-protocol. For simplicity, let us assume for the moment that 
our blobs are described by sets of integers X and Y, and by a verification 
function v, as in sections 6.1 and 6.2 (we thus temporarily rule out oblivious 
transfer blobs, quantum blobs and multi-party blobs). Ivan Damgard has 
pointed out that the basic protocol of section 2 can be used for this purpose. 
Assume for instance that Peggy can open blobs x and x to show the same bit 
and that she would give Vic y and y if she wanted to open these blobs. 
Instead of showing y and y, she uses the basic protocol to convince Vic that 
she knows y and y such that v(x,y) = v(x,y)E {O, 1 }, which is an NP state-
ment! 
It is interesting to note that any bit commitment scheme can be 
transformed into one that also has properties (v) and (vi): it is enough to 
assume the abstract defining blob properties (i) through (iv). This can be 
achieved by an extension of an idea first suggested by Charles H. Bennett. 
This construction will be described in the forthcoming paper on quantum 
cryptography [BB3]. 
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For blobs that already offer property (v) as a primitive, but not property 
(vi) (such as the blobs based on graph isomorphism of section 6.1.3), it is 
more efficient to implement property (vi) through a sub-protocol that makes 
use of property (v). Let x and x be two blobs that Peggy can open to show 
distinct bits. To convince Vic of this fact, Peggy commits to two more blobs 
z and z, claiming that she can open them to show distinct bits. At this point, 
Vic issues one of two possible challenges. As a result, Peggy must either open 
both z and z, thus showing a 0 and a 1, or she must use twice property (v) to 
convince Vic of the equivalence between x and z (or z, whichever is the case) 
and the equivalence between x and z (or z). If the above is repeated k times 
and in fact she could only open x and x to show the same bit, Peggy has only 
a probability 2-k of successful cheating. 
The reverse process is obvious : if Peggy knows how to convince Vic that 
she can open two given blobs to show distinct bits when this is so, and if she 
wishes to convince him that she can open blobs x and x to show the same bit, 
she simply commits to an appropriate blob x' and she convinces him using 
property (vi) that she could open x and x' to show distinct bits and that she 
could also open x and x' to show distinct bits. 
6.6. Multi-valued blobs 
Consider any finite set D. The notion of bit commitment generalizes natur-
ally to that of commitment to an arbitrary member of D. If D contains k ele-
ments, the effect of such a commitment could obviously be obtained through 
commitments to logik ordinary blobs. However, it would be more interesting 
from an efficiency point of view if this could be achieved by committing to a 
single "multi-valued blob". 
In the context of our basic protocol from section 2, truth table entries 
are never opened in isolation. Whenever Peggy opens one such entry, she 
always opens the entire row containing it. We can therefore speed up the 
entire basic protocol nearly threefold if each blob can be opened in 8 different 
ways - corresponding to each possible choices of three bits in a truth table 
row. Of course, this idea is interesting only if the commitment to and open-
ing of multi-valued blobs are not substantially more expensive than the 
corresponding operations on binary blobs. 
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Some of our previously discussed implementations extend easily to 
multi-valued blobs. This is the case of both implementations based--1'.>n the 
discrete logarithm (sections 6.1.2 and 6.2.2). In order to generalize the blobs 
of section 6.1.2, Vic gives Peggy k distinct values s 1 , s2 , ••• , Sk in z; at the 
outset of the protocol (each s; =/:= 1 ). In order to commit to the ith element of 
D, Peggy chooses a random integer y, 0 ~y ~p -2 and computes the blob 
x = s;a.Y mod p. The protocol of [CEG] is in order if it is desirable that Vic 
convince Peggy that he knows the logarithms of all' these s;'s - either to 
obtain chameleon blobs or to remove the requirement that the factoring of 
p - 1 be known (as discussed at the end of section 6.1.2). 
The blobs of section 6.2.1 generalize easily because the loglogp succes-
sive higher-order bits after the uth least-significant bit of a discrete logarithm 
are simultaneously as secure as the uth least-significant bit alone [Pe]. Using 
these bits, (logp )-valued blobs can be realized. 
7. Is it Better to Trust the Prover or the Verifier? 
"Cheating" takes on a different meaning, depending on whether one is talking 
about Peggy or Vic. For Vic to cheat means that he learns something beyond 
the fact that Peggy has access to the information she claims to have. Perhaps 
he did not quite obtain the Hamiltonian circuit he is desperately seeking, for 
instance, but he learned enough to drastically reduce his search. On the other 
hand, for Peggy to cheat means that she succeeds in convincing Vic that she 
has information that would pass the certifying procedure, when in fact she 
does not. 
It is also interesting to distinguish between lucky and daring successful 
cheating. The former refers to Peggy or Vic figuring out - against all odds 
- a piece of information that will enable him/her to quietly go about his/her 
cheating with the certainty of being successful and undetected. The latter 
refers to Peggy or Vic taking an illegal move that is almost certainly going to 
result in his/her cheating being detected at some point in the future, but that 
might nonetheless, with an exponentially small probability, allow him/her to 
succeed. Finally, cheating may be called retroactive (or off-line) if it can take 
place some time after the protocol is completed, by looking back at its tran-
scripJ ; it is real-time if it must be completed while the protocol is taking 
place. 
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If the blobs of section 6.2 are used (corresponding to the protocols previ-
ously given by [GMW, BCl]), Peggy could never participate with peace of 
mind : an algorithmic breakthrough might allow Vic to cheat retroactively, 
even if the new algorithm is not fast enough for a real-time response while the 
protocol is taking place. Even if the cryptographic assumption turns out to 
be well-founded, Vic still has a (very slight) probability of lucky (hence 
undetectable) cheating. On the other hand, regardless of any assumptions, 
the only cheating Peggy could attempt would be of the daring kind. 
By contrast, if the blobs of section 6.1.1 are used (corresponding to the 
protocols previously given in [Ch4, BC2]), the only way Vic can hope to learn 
anything about Peggy's secret is to be daring right from the beginning and to 
choose a quadratic non-residue as his s. He would almost certainly get caught 
by Peggy while trying to convince her that s is a quadratic residue, but would 
if successful be capable of distinguishing blobs used by Peggy as commitments 
to 0 from those used for 1. Asking Vic to disclose a square root of s at the 
end of the protocol (which is not detrimental to him at that point, assuming 
he is honest), provides Peggy with certainty that Vic has not learned any of 
her secrets (and never will retroactively). If the blobs of section 6.1.2 are 
used, even this unlikely opportunity for daring cheating is not available to 
Vic. On the other hand, with the implementations of section 6.1, Vic's belief 
that Peggy cannot cheat depends on his belief in the appropriate crypto-
graphic assumption. With the implementation of section 6.1.1, for instance, 
Peggy could "open" any quadratic residue as either 0 or 1, whichever suits her 
best, if she could only obtain a square root of s before the end of the first 
round in which she is asked a challenge she is not otherwise prepared to 
answer. (Obtaining this square root at any later time would be of no use to 
her.) Moreover, even if the cryptographic assumption is well-founded, Peggy 
still has a (very slight) possibility of breaking it by luck, but she must be dar-
ing to suggest conducting the protocol in the hope that she will be so lucky. 
Finally, retroactive cheating is meaningless for either party in this context. 
An algorithm capable of factoring in two weeks, for instance, would spell 
doom to the protocol if blobs were implemented as in section 6.2.1, but it 
would be of no immediate consequence with the blobs of section 6.1.1. 
lJ blobs unconditionally secure for Peggy are used (section 6.1), addi-
tional security for Vic is obtained by asking Peggy to repeat the entire 
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protocol with a different type of blob each time (as pointed out originally in 
[Ch4]). In order to cheat, this would force Peggy to be capable of breaking 
several different cryptographic assumptions. For instance, she would need 
efficient on-line algorithms both for factoring and for extracting discrete loga-
rithms. Curiously, the opposite effect is obtained with the blobs that are 
unconditionally secure for Vic (section 6.2): repeating the protocol with 
different types of blobs would only make it easier for Vic to cheat since he 
can do so by breaking (possibly off-line) any one of the underlying crypto-
graphic assumptions. Nonetheless, increased security can be obtained if 
several types of blobs unconditionally secure for Vic are combined in a 
different way : each time Peggy wishes to commit to some bit b, she commits 
to one blob of each type at random except that b is the exclusive-or of the 
corresponding bits. Naturally, using this strategy with blobs unconditionally 
secure for Peggy would only make it easier for her to cheat. 
Is it preferable to trust Vic or Peggy? We do not know, but it sure is 
nice to have the choice ! Finally, consider the following provocative situa-
tion : suppose that Peggy claims to have proven Theorem T and she uses the 
blobs of section 6.1.1 to convince a skeptical Vic of this. At the end of the 
protocol, regardless of any unproved assumptions, Vic will be convinced that 
Peggy has either a proof of T or hot results on integer factoring ! In particu-
lar, no assumptions are needed if T's claim is: "I have an efficient factoring 
algorithm" ... 
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